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THE KEY TO STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA -  
UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA

by

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## *Preface*

From June 1996 until May 1998, I served as the Chief of Space Operations, on the C/J-3 operations staff, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, Yongsan Garrison, Republic of Korea. During this period I also held an additional duty as a Crisis Action Team / Battlestaff Executive Officer. It was in these two positions that my interest in Northeast Asian national security policy and the impacts on the Korean Peninsula started. While serving on the combined crisis action team and battlestaff, I was able to observe first hand how our military strategy was implemented, and operations plans developed for the Korean Theater. I was very impressed with the competence, professional spirit, and abilities that the combined ROK-US military forces possessed to deter conflict or defeat the enemy, if deterrence failed.

As in most military assignments, day-to-day duties usually preclude you from having the time to conduct detailed background research on the very policies and strategies you are implementing. Therefore, I am very grateful having been selected to spend my Senior Service School year in an Air Force Fellowship. It has given me the opportunity to examine the national security environment on the Korean Peninsula from a scholarly, research perspective. Looking back on it, I wish I had this background on Korean security issues before I arrived for duty on the Peninsula.

When I started this project, I thought the “biggest” issue would be determining US policy for a “unified” Korea. Little did I know that North Korea would pull out of the



1994 Agreed Framework, withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and threaten to re-start production of nuclear weapons. As these developments took place, I decided that a chapter on recent US policy needed to be included. For this paper, recent is up to and including mid-March 2003. This most recent North Korean crisis is still in full swing and has not been resolved. As soon as the situation changes, any policy recommendations could or should be “overtaken by events”. Therefore, I’ve limited my thoughts on policy recommendations to broad ideas and not specific actions to resolve the current crisis.

I would like to thank the faculty and staff at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University for allowing me to spend my fellowship with them. Their first-class program on national security, economic security and foreign policy gave me many fertile thoughts toward researching national security issues.

### *Abstract*

As another crisis looms on the horizon for the Korean Peninsula, the major powers in Northeast Asia are working to defuse the situation. Since 1950, the United States has been a key player in the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK). This paper will explore the national security relationships between the United States, China and Japan and how they relate to both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). The current security environment including the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States; the role of the current military structure, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command; and the threat that North Korea presents will be highlighted. Several regional powers also exert influence on the Korean Peninsula. A key ally for the United States is Japan. This security relationship is based on the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The specific roles and responsibilities for both countries will be addressed along with potential future directions for this alliance. Historically an ally of North Korea, China is becoming a true wildcard for Korea. In August 1992, China established diplomatic relations with South Korea, significantly changing their relationship with North Korea. These economic ties with South Korea and the impact this has on the security ties with the DPRK will be explored. The final section of this paper will deal with US policy for Northeast Asia and the impacts Japan and China could have on future relationships.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*Today, Korea is the only place in the world where 35 million people live within the range and threat of enemy artillery. Without almost no notice, two million soldiers could be locked in combat.*

—General Thomas A. Schwartz  
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command, 1999-2002

It is difficult to read a newspaper today without seeing an article on North Korea. The *Washington Post* recently reported “N. Korea Admits Having Secret Nuclear Arms” while the *New York Times* stated “North Korea’s Nuclear Plans Called ‘Unacceptable’; Bush Seeks a Diplomatic Solution.” Headlines that show, once again, that North Korea conducts its national policy by creating crises and by using brinkmanship to gain concession from other nations. And they have been very successful. Since North Korea admitted to Undersecretary of State James A. Kelly in October 2002 that they were continuing to pursue work on a nuclear weapons program, they have turned the world’s attention once again to the Korean peninsula.

How does a country of 23 million people, with a size roughly of the state of Mississippi, cause such a stir in Northeast Asia? Why do the worlds’ greatest powers respond immediately when North Korea makes threats or rattles its saber? Is the Korean peninsula a key to peace and stability in Northeast Asia?

This paper will attempt to address these questions by looking at the relationships three great powers have with Korea. It will first define the importance of the Korean peninsula in terms of the security environment within Northeast Asia. Then it will look at the role North Korea is playing and the threat it poses to the peninsula. To offset this threat, the Republic of Korea and the United States have a long standing military alliance and a combined military organization. This Combined Forces Command will be highlighted to include force structure, exercise programs and current force modernization plans.

The next several chapters will address the policy roles that the United States, Japan and China play with respect to the Korean peninsula. Economic, diplomatic and military issues will be discussed.

The final chapter of this paper will focus on future US policy and strategy issues. It will address implications of engagement, US presence, alliances and future operations.

As this paper is being written, the dynamics of the future of the Korean peninsula are in full motion. Although it is difficult to impossible to predict specific outcomes, it is hopeful that aspects of this paper will give the reader a point of departure on security issues on the Korean peninsula and provide for a better understanding of events that may unfold there.

## Chapter 2

### Importance of Korean Peninsula

*My vision is clear: I see a Peninsula that is one day united in commerce and cooperation, instead of divided by barbed wire and fear.*

—President George W. Bush

### Economic

With three states bordering on, one state surrounded by and several territories located in the Pacific Ocean - the United States is a pacific nation. Many of our top trading partners are located in the Pacific Rim. “In the course of a single generation, the countries of Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have risen respectively to numbers 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 in total trade with the US”<sup>1</sup> The Republic of Korea, with \$626 Billion, has risen to be the 13<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world when measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>2</sup> The stability of this region directly contributes to the economic viability of this region. To that end, the official United States defense objective in East Asia and the Pacific Rim is to seek “a stable and economically prosperous East Asia that embraces democratic reform and market economics.”<sup>3</sup> Looking at this from a regional economic viewpoint, “the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 36 percent of US trade, roughly equivalent to our trade with North and South America combined and more than double our trade with Europe. Over the next 10 years, it is

expected that 60 percent of the world's economic growth will occur in the Asia-Pacific area.”<sup>4</sup>

US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell reinforced the importance of this region on a trip to East Asia in February 2002. He said, “Our first goal and highest priority for Asia must be to help create the secure conditions under which freedom can flourish -- economic freedom and political freedom. And security, first and foremost, is essential to economic growth and political freedom.”<sup>5</sup>

Each of the great Asian powers is trying to influence events in this region. However, the “one goal that the four powers will continue to have in common is a desire for stability on the Korean Peninsula.”<sup>6</sup> With a peaceful and stable region, the countries can focus on their economic development and trade. A “foundation of regional security is economic prosperity. International trade helps to alleviate conflict and even prevent war; and the more trade, the better chance for order and peace.”<sup>7</sup>

While many of the nations in Northeast Asia have robust, growing economies; there is one nation that does not – North Korea. In fact, this country has one of the most isolated economies and has experienced negative economic growth in the late 1990s and slight growth the past several years.<sup>8</sup> Over the past eight years there have also been food shortages due to weather-related problems, poor central planning and lack of fertilizers.<sup>9</sup> Even with a dwindling economy, North Korea continued to allocate its resources to its military.

The leadership in North Korea is clearly focused on their economic and political survival and understands the role of the military to achieve this. They have built the

world's fifth largest military force and continue to maintain a high degree of readiness.<sup>10</sup>  
This military force can strike southward with little to no warning.

## **Geopolitics**

In addition to economic factors, Korea has a geopolitical element to it. The Korean Peninsula is very strategically located within Northeast Asia. Its geographic location not only makes it a focal point within this region, but presents it with a unique set of security issues. Within 1,000 kilometers of Seoul are the four largest militaries of the world: China, Russia, United States (with ROK alliance), and North Korea. "Korea continues to be where the interests of the United States, Japan, China, and Russia converge. Therefore, this geopolitical factor must be taken into consideration in the formulation of any security strategy." <sup>11</sup>

The countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula are devoting a large share of their national wealth to increase their military power. The former Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command in Korea, General Thomas Schwartz, made the following statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Northeast Asia is currently the world's most dynamic region ... Five of the world's six largest militaries (China, US, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea) and four nuclear-capable powers converge on the Korean peninsula. Northeast Asia's military forces are primarily ground-focused and lack precision weapons. Conflict would result in tremendous devastation, property destruction and loss of life. In this geo-political landscape, the presence of US forces supports peace and stability to the region. Northeast Asia is truly a critical region for the US and the world.<sup>12</sup>

This convergence of many nations has brought conflict to the Korean peninsula. "Throughout history, great powers have clashed on the Korean peninsula. As a result, the Korean peninsula has witnessed over 30 major wars in its history."<sup>13</sup> The last major

conflict was, of course, the Korean War. However, since 1953, there has been a long period of peace.

A significant contribution to the peace on the peninsula has been the military alliance between the ROK and the US. “The US alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) stands as a model relationship among democratic nations. It is a powerful alliance that is fully inter-operable in all aspects of joint and combined war fighting. Through our incredible power and might, we [ROK/US] enforce the Armistice while supporting peace and regional security.”<sup>14</sup>

This alliance is also very important to the ROK. “South Korea’s defense planning during the past five decades has centered around how to deter and defend the South against the North’s formidable military threat. Despite the end of the Cold War, Seoul’s defense planning still remains threat driven. Because Seoul could not deter and defend itself alone, it entered into an alliance with the United States as its security guarantor.”<sup>15</sup>

## **High-tension Environment**

There are several places within the world that could draw US military forces into conflict. The CIA Worldfact book lists over 65 current disputes over borders, maritime boundaries, economic zones, island claims, and demarcation lines.<sup>16</sup> Many of these have the potential to lead to armed conflict. However, the one area that stays in the forefront as a flashpoint is the Korean peninsula.

Over the last fifty years, tensions have remained high and frequently approached crisis levels on the Korean peninsula. “Here we find two regimes separated by that country’s demilitarized zone maintaining Cold War force levels and implacably opposed



ideologies.”<sup>17</sup> According to the Commander, United States Pacific Command, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, “the place where the stakes are highest continues to be on the Korean peninsula.”<sup>18</sup>

The most recent threat by North Korea is the resumption of its nuclear development program. Held in check under a 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK, North Korea admitted in October 2002 that it is resuming development of enriching uranium for nuclear weapons.<sup>19</sup> Not only does this violate several international commitments, but adds another layer of complexity to the security of the Korean peninsula. If North Korea indeed successfully develops nuclear weapons how will this affect the balance of power in the region? Will South Korea and Japan “go nuclear” too? How will China and Russia react? In short, it has the potential to completely affect the security dynamics and make a dangerous place even more so.

## **Reunification**

A secure and stable region is the foundation that the economies of this area depend upon. US Department of Defense policy supports maintaining a stable balance in Asia and identifies it as a critical task.<sup>20</sup> The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea policy states it will “contribute to regional stability and world peace” in its national defense objective.<sup>21</sup>

Specific US security strategy with respect to the Republic of Korea (ROK) focuses on resolution of the Korean conflict and the reunification of North and South Korea.

The long-run US objective remains a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, democratic, reconciled, and ultimately reunified Peninsula. Toward this end, the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) serves as the foundation on which all US diplomatic, defense, and economic efforts on the Korean

Peninsula rest. Our treaty commitment and the presence of US troops in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the US would immediately be fully engaged in any such conflict. The US and ROK continue to maintain and strengthen the three major elements of our security alliance: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, bilateral consultations and combined military forces.<sup>22</sup>

The Republic of Korea has a very similar viewpoint on its defense strategy. “South Korea’s defense goals are articulated as follows: to defend the nation from external military threats and aggression, to support a peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.”<sup>23</sup>

Both the US and ROK strategies support defense, unification of the peninsula and to provide stability to the region. An additional element of a unified Korea would be the tremendous economic benefit associated with it. The impact becomes staggering. “This future, new Korea will be a democratic country of 70-plus million, with an educated, hard-working populace, the world’s fourth-largest trading country.”<sup>24</sup>

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> General Thomas A. Schwartz, “Statement Before the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee”, 5 March 2002, United States Forces Korea Public Affairs Office News Release, n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 November 2002, available from [http://www.senate.gov/~armed\\_services/statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf](http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, “Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress”, 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 21 October 2002, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/index.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, “The Asia-Pacific Region: A US Pacific Command Perspective,” in *Strength Through Cooperation: Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Frances Omori and Mary A. Sommerville (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 3.

<sup>5</sup> Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner”, New York City, 10 June 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, Available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10983.htm>.

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<sup>6</sup> Ralph A. Cossa, *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security*, McNair paper no 51, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 6.

<sup>7</sup> Tun-jen Cheng and Hung-mao Tien, "Introduction" in *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 4.

<sup>8</sup> Bank of Korea and Country Watch estimates, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from [http://www.countrywatch.com/forecast/base\\_data.inc.asp?vcountry=91](http://www.countrywatch.com/forecast/base_data.inc.asp?vcountry=91).

<sup>9</sup> CIA Worldfact Book, North Korea Economic Conditions

<sup>10</sup> Joseph S. Bermudez, *The Armed Forces of North Korea*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ro-myung Gong, "Forward" in *U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations*, ix.

<sup>12</sup> Schwartz, Written statement before the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 3-4.

<sup>13</sup> Schwartz, Senate Armed Services Committee statement, 3.

<sup>14</sup> General Thomas A. Schwartz, "U.S. Forces, Korea and UN Command / ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command: Strength Through Friendship", in *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Summer 2001, 47.

<sup>15</sup> Han, 197.

<sup>16</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, 2002, (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), Field Listing-Disputes-international section, n.p., on-line, Internet, 21 October 2002, available from <http://www.cia.gov/cai/publications/factbook/fields/2070.html/>.

<sup>17</sup> William T. Tow, *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 84.

<sup>18</sup> Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, "Testimony to Senate Armed Forces Committee for confirmation as Commander-in-Chief, PACOM", 26 April 2002, (Camp Smith, Hi.: United States Pacific Command), n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/speeches.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> James A. Kelly, "Statement by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs", United States Embassy, Seoul, ROK, October 19, 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 21 November 2002, available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/www43cv.html>.

<sup>20</sup> Department of Defense, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress", 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 21 October 2002, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/index.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> ROK, *Defense White Paper 2000*, 68.

<sup>22</sup> Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs), November 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/>.

<sup>23</sup> Yong Sup Han, "South Korea's Strategy of Conflict: The Past, Present, and Future," in *Strength Through Cooperation*, 198.

<sup>24</sup> Michael A. McDevitt and James A. Kelly, "In Search of Stability: Designing for a Better Peace in East Asia," in *U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a "Virtual Alliance"*, ed. Ralph Cossa, (Washington DC: The CSIS Press, 1999), 151.

## Chapter 3

### THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT

*North Korea poses a significant conventional threat on the peninsula and continues to be a major exporter of ballistic missiles and associated technology. As such, North Korea poses a risk not just on the peninsula, but also throughout the region, and across the globe.*

—Admiral Thomas B. Fargo  
Commander, US Pacific Command

North Korean possesses a very credible and capable military force. They have brought together a potent combination of ground, air naval and special operations forces as a direct threat to the peninsula. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, while Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command viewed the Korean situation like this. “The Korean peninsula is our most immediate security concern. North Korea is an anomaly in the region, not sharing in the prosperity brought by mutual trade and engagement. While it’s under economic pressure, North Korea retains a major military capability to lash out if cornered.”<sup>1</sup>

### Leadership

One aspect in determining how dangerous a threat could be is the will of the leadership to use its military capability to resolve a conflict. As North Korea demonstrated in June 1950, Kim Il Song was very determined to re-unite the peninsula under force. Today, his son, Kim Jong-Il is firmly in control of the Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea (DPRK). He holds the two most powerful positions in that country: General Secretary of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA). His regime "continues to focus on three fundamental themes – regime survival, reunification, and achieving status as a 'great and powerful nation.'"<sup>2</sup> Of the three themes, it appears that regime survival is the top priority for the Kim government. "The regime in Pyongyang is focused on political survival, and this preoccupation drives national strategies. The military remains the top North Korean priority. Despite massive famine and food shortages, the Korean People's Army (KPA) has been absorbing more of the North's diminishing resources."<sup>3</sup> This diversion of resources to the military is known as the "military first" policy.

The North Korean leadership has been very effective at using propaganda and crisis development to gain political leverage. One common strategy for North Korea has been the use of brinkmanship to achieve national goals. An example of this happened in June 1999 when "North Korean naval vessels crossed the northern limit line in the West Sea in an attempt to raise tension against South Korea prior to the South-North vice ministerial level talks and the US-North Korea negotiations"<sup>4</sup>. Missile testing and now nuclear weapons are two latest examples of creating events that allow the North to gain a bargaining position "in an attempt to benefit from the crises it creates. In most cases, Pyongyang escapes with large economic benefits".<sup>5</sup>

Kim Jong-Il has also been active in the diplomatic arena to gain support for his country. A major break through occurred in 2000 between North and South Korea. For the first time in decades, the two leaders had a face-to-face meeting. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung hosted the meeting in June 2000. Although hailed as a historic

meeting between the two leaders, actual policy changes never materialized. Kim Jong-il increased his diplomatic push the following year. “In 2001, North Korea continued to undertake active diplomacy and normalize relations with 13 countries, including Germany and Canada, raising the number of countries with which it has established official diplomatic ties to 151.”<sup>6</sup> Kim Jong-il expanded his diplomatic effort in 2002 and met with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi on September 17, 2002. The summit started a dialogue between these regional neighbors, although these talks did not generate any historic break through. It did, however, add to North Korea’s plan to preserve their regime by normalizing relations with as many countries as possible.

The propaganda and diplomatic efforts of the North Korean leadership has been bolstered with their military force. With a priority diversion of resources to the military, the DPRK has built and modernized a tremendous military capability. “Today, North Korea has the world’s fifth largest military, with the third largest army, and the world’s largest Special Operations Force.”<sup>7</sup> With a population of only 20-25 million people and the number of males at half that number,<sup>8</sup> they are fielding an army of “approximately one million active duty forces and a reserve force of more than 5 million, North Korea is the most militarized nation on earth.”<sup>9</sup> In layman’s terms, that would place almost every able-bodied North Korean male, of military age, in association with the military.

## **Ground Forces**

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is comprised of eight conventional light infantry corps, four mechanized infantry corps, and armored corps, two artillery corps and a capital defense corps. Aligned with areas of responsibilities as depicted in the following chart<sup>10</sup>:



**Figure 1 North Korean Ground Forces**

The majority of their ground forces are ready to lash out and are within striking distance of South Korea. “Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations.”<sup>11</sup> The following graphic shows this concentration of forces within the shaded area on the map.



**Figure 2 Forward Deployment**

These ground forces are supported with a credible punch from long-range artillery. “The North fields a total artillery force of over 12,000 systems, including 500 long-range systems, deployed over the past decade, with the ability to strike Seoul from their current location.”<sup>12</sup> And they continue to improve their military readiness and capability by deploying “large numbers of long-range 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm self-propelled guns.”<sup>13</sup>



Another part of the North Korean military force structure that can reach into South Korea is their theater ballistic missile (TBM) inventory. They have been updating and improving on Soviet-era SCUD missiles for decades. “Their ballistic missile inventory now includes over 500 SCUDs of various types. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range No Dongs capable of striking United States bases in Japan. Pyongyang is developing multi-stage missiles with the goal of fielding systems capable of striking the Continental United States.”<sup>14</sup> TBMs are often referred to as asymmetrical forces because they give the attacker an advantage over the defender. Because of the short time-of-flight for a TBM, there would be very little advanced warning of a missile attack. If armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, the destructive power increases tremendously. A ballistic missile program also provides a “powerful diplomatic and political leverage”<sup>15</sup> which contributes to the Kim regime’s goal of building a “great and powerful nation”.

Theater ballistic missiles are also a growth industry for North Korea. They continue to focus research and development efforts on extending the range of these weapon systems. “They have tested the 2,000-kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 missile and continue significant work on the 5,000 plus kilometer Taepo Dong 2 missile.”<sup>16</sup> Exporting these missiles to other countries creates a source of trade for North Korea. “Pyongyang is one of the world’s largest missile proliferators and sells its missiles and technology to anyone with hard currency.”<sup>17</sup>

Appendix A shows the threat rings of short, medium and long-range missiles the North Koreans have today.

## **Air Forces**

The North Korean Air Force (NKAf) also has the ability to strike deep into the ROK. With an “inventory of more than 1,600 aircraft and 103,000 personnel, the NKAf has more than 800 combat jet aircraft, most of these are 1950’s and 1960’s vintage aircraft.”<sup>18</sup> They lack any appreciable number of modern fighter aircraft, but do possess “roughly 60 (MiG 23,29) provided by the former Soviet Union during the 1980’s.”<sup>19</sup> Although many of their aircraft are vintage when compared to U. S. standards, the sheer number of them makes an imposing threat. In the words of a former 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force Commander, Lt Gen Ronald W. Iverson, “Quantity is a quality all of it’s own.”

The primary mission for the NKAf will be defense of North Korea with a secondary mission of special operations forces (SOF) insertion and supporting ground forces. They would support the SOF mission with 300 AN-2 Colts.<sup>20</sup> The AN-2 colt is a fabric-covered bi-plane that has the capability to perform short field take-offs and landings. Ideally suited to fly low in the mountainous Korean terrain and avoid ROK radar systems. These AN-2s are well suited for delivery of nK SOF troops.

Protecting the airspace of North Korea is a vast array of early warning radars and surface-to-air missiles. “With SAMs supplied by the former Soviet Union during the 1980’s and more than 10,800 anti-aircraft guns, North Korea has one of the most dense and redundant air defense networks in the world. Their most capable system is the SA-5, a system designed to defend against long range, high altitude targets. From its current locations, it can range aircraft in ROK air space.”<sup>21</sup>

## Naval Forces

The naval forces of North Korea are primarily used close to the shore. This “brown water” navy includes “approximately 430 combat vessels (patrol craft, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, fire support craft combatants consisting primarily of older patrol and torpedo boats.) However, North Korea has 39 missile attack boats equipped with the 25 nautical mile range STYX anti-ship missile and 26 attack submarines.”<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the traditional naval missions, the North Korean Navy will also be used to insert SOF elements. The Korean peninsula is surrounded on three sides by water, making SOF infiltration over water a very attractive option. “86% of the ROK border is coastline, inundated with thousands of rocky inlets, and is conducive to maritime infiltration operations.”<sup>23</sup> The North Korean Navy has a number of vessels specifically designed for this task. “These craft include a variety of submarines, coastal patrol craft, high-speed semi-submersible craft, air-cushioned amphibious craft, and rubber raiding craft.”<sup>24</sup> Of special note are their air-cushioned amphibious craft. “The North Korean Navy itself has over 130 air-cushioned vessels. Each is capable of carrying up to fifty fully equipped personnel. These amphibious craft can reach speeds up to 50 knots per hour and are hard to detect. Within a short period of time, North Korea can move approximately 7,000 maritime SOF personnel to many disbursed debarkation points along both coastlines of the ROK.”<sup>25</sup> SOF forces can also be infiltrated by submarine. Not only is this a wartime threat, but also a threat day-to-day. Back in 1996, a Sango-class midget submarine was found in the shallow shores in the East Sea by the ROK city of Kangnung.

Lastly, the naval threat also includes mine laying. Since the bulk of US forces are not garrisoned in the ROK, the sea lines of communication are very important to reinforcing the peninsula. Therefore the North Korean Navy has an “extensive mine laying capability.”<sup>26</sup>

### **Special Operations Forces**

Utilizing land, air and sea-lanes to infiltrate the ROK, the North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF) are extremely capable. These forces are comprised of Light Infantry Brigades, Airborne Brigades, Airborne Sniper Brigades and Reconnaissance Battalions. The light infantry is assigned to each of the four forward infantry Corps to conduct special operations missions as assigned.<sup>27</sup> The Airborne Brigades have the capability to be airlifted and dropped into the ROK/US rear areas. Their mission would be to seize and hold key facilities, command and control complexes, and conduct direct attacks behind the lines. The Airborne Sniper Brigades have a similar mission but will focus their destruction towards air bases, missile and radar sites.<sup>28</sup> The Sniper Brigades are some of the most elite troops North Korea has. The Reconnaissance Battalions are assigned to the forward Corps along the DMZ. “Their mission is primarily DMZ infiltration and reconnaissance of the ROK forward areas.”<sup>29</sup>

North Korean SOF actively conducts training exercises and actual infiltration missions into the ROK. In October 1996, a 3-man SOF team was stranded in the ROK when their submarine went aground during exfiltration. This North Korean SOF team alluded ROK forces for over 6-weeks before being shot and killed during capture. These types of missions are routinely conducted, and the majority are never detected.

The ability for North Korea SOF to infiltrate into the ROK rear areas and conduct “second front” operations would be a large threat during a conflict.

It is estimated that North Korea will infiltrate approximately 100,000 SOF troops into the forward and rear areas of the ROK in contingency. They may then attempt to destroy command and communication facilities, cut off lines of communication, assassinate important personnel, demolish or cripple major facilities such as airfields to reduce Seoul’s war sustainability, and harass our forces in the rear area-turning virtually all of South Korea into a battlefield.<sup>30</sup>

General Thomas Schwartz, CINCCFC 1999-2002, was very concerned that “the North will concentrate SOF against our critical war fighting nodes and seek to prevent rapid force and sortie generation by US and ROK forces.”<sup>31</sup>

## **Weapons of Mass Destruction**

To round out the North Korean force structure are their weapons of mass destruction. “A large number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military forces and civilian population centers of South Korea and Japan. We assess that North Korea has very large chemical stockpiles and is self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first generation chemical agents. Additionally, North Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and weaponize biological agents.”<sup>32</sup> These biological agents “include bacterial spores causing anthrax and smallpox and the bacteria causing the plague and cholera.”<sup>33</sup>

The final area of weapons of mass destruction is the North Korean nuclear capability. “Until 1994, North Korea had an active nuclear weapons program. The Soviet-supplied research reactor at Yongbyon was capable of producing weapons grade plutonium.”<sup>34</sup> With the signing of the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994, North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon reactor, along with two larger reactors under construction. “In

return, North Korea will receive supplies of fuel oil and two light water reactors.”<sup>35</sup>

However there is still a concern over the potential North Korean nuclear threat. “Though in January 2002, North Korea allowed the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to visit an isotope facility, North Korea refuses to comply with non-proliferation protocols. Current assessments indicate that North Korea may have produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibility two, nuclear weapons.”<sup>36</sup>

When weapons of mass destruction are coupled with delivery systems like aircraft, artillery rounds, or theater ballistic missiles, the threat increases substantially. The North Koreans are also very skilled in using these weapons as bargaining chips in their diplomatic negotiations.

### **North Korean Economy**

Although not a threat to world economies, the North Korean economy has been a limiting factor on the further development and modernization of their military capability. Throughout the 1990s, the North Korean economy experienced negative growth.<sup>37</sup> Continuing its “military first” policy, “the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been absorbing more of the North’s diminishing resources.”<sup>38</sup> In actual terms, spending on the military has increased. “North Korea has allocated \$1.42 billion, 14.5% of its national budget for the 2001 defense outlay, which is a 4.4% increase compared to 2000.”<sup>39</sup> To fuel these high military expenditures, North Korea has turned to “arms exports, independently developed weapons and business set up within the military [to] bring in foreign currency.”<sup>40</sup>

North Korea has also increased its diplomatic efforts to gain economic assistance. “Kim has opted to turn North Korea into an aid-based, aid dependent economy.”<sup>41</sup> There have been a few economic initiatives with South Korea including “the restoration of cross-border Seoul-Shinuiju Railway, the expansion of tourism to Mt. Kumgang, and the construction of Kaesong industrial complex.”<sup>42</sup> However, any further openings of the North Korean economy to outside adventures would be minimized to maintain Kim’s control of the country. “Any real opening of the North Korean economy and society would put at risk the control mechanisms of the regime, and the regime itself.”<sup>43</sup>

“Despite the changing times, uncertainty still exists; the North Korean military threat remains real and dangerous. Consequently, North Korea remains the major security threat in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, North Korea’s dogged adherence to a “military-first” policy – when viewed against a backdrop of a nation on the brink of economic and social collapse – is problematic.”<sup>44</sup> It is clear to see that North Korea possesses a very capable, forward deployed military force structure. When combined with their “military first” policy and several training exercises each year to maintain combat effectiveness, what is holding back Kim Jong Il from fulfilling his re-unification goal? The answer is very simple: the ROK-US military alliance and the Combined Forces Command.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, “The Asia-Pacific Region: A U.S. Pacific Command Perspective,” in *Strength Through Cooperation: Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Frances Omori and Mary A. Sommerville (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 8.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, *2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 12 September 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html>.

<sup>3</sup> James J. Przystup, “Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula,” Strategic Forum No. 190, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.:

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<sup>4</sup> Korea Institute for National Unification, *The Unification Environment and Relations Between South and North Korea: 1999~2000*, (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2000), 84.

<sup>5</sup> To-hai Liou, "North Korea's Diplomatic Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era: Fishing in Troubled Waters," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2. ed. Kim, Kyu-Ryoon (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2001), 82.

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of National Defense, Republic Of Korea, *Defense Data & Statistics 2001*, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.mnd.go.kr/english/html/02/2001/1-2-1.htm>.

<sup>7</sup> General Thomas A. Schwartz, "U.S. Forces, Korea and UN Command / ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command: Strength Through Friendship", in *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Summer 2001, 50.

<sup>8</sup> Library of Congress, *North Korea: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 34, on-line, Internet, November 2002, available from <http://www.lcweb.gov>.

<sup>9</sup> Public Affairs Office, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, Eight United States Army, "North Korean Military Capabilities", *Backgrounder No. 13*, (Seoul, Korea: Yongsan Army Garrison, January 1998), 1, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/backgrounder/bg13.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Colonel William Drennan, "Korean Peninsula," in *Strategic Assessment 1997*, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997), n.p., on-line, Internet, November 2002, available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa97/sa97ch8.html>.

<sup>11</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 4.

<sup>12</sup> General Thomas A. Schwartz, "Statement Before the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee", 5 March 2002, United States Forces Korea Public Affairs Office News Release, 7, on-line, Internet, November 2002, available from [http://www.senate.gov/~armed\\_services/statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf](http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Schwartz, Senate Armed Forces Committee statement, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 4.

<sup>18</sup> CFC *Backgrounder #13*, 1-2.

<sup>19</sup> CFC *Backgrounder #13*, 2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>23</sup> Public Affairs Office, United States Forces Korea, *Using Innovation and Synergy to Solve a Very Real and Substantial Threat*, (Seoul, ROK: Yongsan Army Garrison), 2, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/news/AntiSOF.html>.

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<sup>27</sup> Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 78-79.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 80.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 82.

<sup>30</sup> The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 2000*, (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2000), 52.

<sup>31</sup> Schwartz, Senate Armed Forces Committee statement, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 4.

<sup>34</sup> CFC Backgrounder No 13, 3.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Schwartz, Senate Armed Forces Committee statement, 9.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, section 2-3.

<sup>38</sup> Przystup, 2.

<sup>39</sup> ROK MND *Defense Data & Statistics 2001*, section 2-3.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Przystup, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Seung-Yul Oh, "Inter-Korean Economic Relationship and Its Prospects: Policy Implications," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2001), 155.

<sup>43</sup> Przystup, 2.

<sup>44</sup> Schwartz, *Strength through Friendship*, 49.

## **Chapter 4**

### **ROK-US Military Alliance**

*The ROK-US alliance is essential for our national interest and the combined defense posture is also indispensable. In extreme terms, they are also necessary for the lives of the Korean people and ROK service members.*

—Kim Dae-jung  
President, Republic of Korea, 1998-2003

#### **Mutual Defense Treaty**

To deter the North Korean threat of attack, the Republic of Korea entered into a defense alliance with the United States. This was formalized when the “ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty” took effect on November 18, 1954. This treaty provides the foundation for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. It also provides the legal basis for the United States to defend the Republic of Korea. “The alliance between the ROK and the US contributed in significant ways to the deterrence of war on the peninsula, improvement of the economy in the region, and the creation of the framework for the ROK’s independent defense.”<sup>1</sup>

Article 3 of the treaty “recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties...would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would

act to meet the common danger...”<sup>2</sup> This article was further clarified to ensure that only in case of an “external armed attack” would obligate either the ROK or the US<sup>3</sup> The treaty also provides for the stationing of US troops on the Peninsula and a collective defense.

Other important parts of the alliance are a Status of Forces Agreement signed in 1966, formal Security Consultative Meetings from 1968, the creation of the Combined Forces Command in 1978 and a Wartime Host Nation support agreement concluded in 1991.<sup>4</sup> “For South Korea, the military alliance with the United States has been central to its national security for defense and deterrence since 1953.”<sup>5</sup>

The common defense strategy the ROK and the US share for the peninsula has been forged in blood since US troops fought along side ROK troops during the Korean War. This special relationship is continuing today. As the previous Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command, General Thomas Schwartz states, “In the ROK/US alliance we have a special spirit and a special bond. It was forged in blood during the Korean War and it still binds us today.”<sup>6</sup>

The alliance has been very effective over the past 50 years. However, several changes have taken place during that same time period. The most important change has been the changing threat. As the Cold War came to an end, both the Soviet Union/Russia and the People’s Republic of China changed their relationships with South Korea. Russia and China have both established diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea. However, as the Russian and Chinese assistance to North Korea decreased, the military capability and readiness of North Korea increased. In many ways, the North Korean threat became

more unpredictable. General John H. Tilelli, former Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command states, “North Korea's unpredictability strengthens the ROK-US alliance. We gather strength from the knowledge that an unpredictable North Korea is poised in a threatening and offensive stance just a few miles away.”<sup>7</sup>

The strength of this alliance can also be seen when the Republic of Korea agreed to support the United States in the war on terrorism, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They are providing both air and naval logistical support in Central Asia. “The ROK deployed four C-130 aircraft, a naval tank landing ship for logistics support and a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Manas International Airport in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Bilateral Consultations**

A key feature of the alliance is the opportunity for the ROK Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense to hold bilateral consultations in the form of Security Consultative Meetings (SCM). The latest SCM was held on December 5, 2002 and focused on the heightened threat posed by the recent admission of North Korea to re-starting their nuclear weapons program. “Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister [Lee Jun] agreed on the need to continue to maintain a US troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and concurred that the alliance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.”<sup>9</sup> Other current alliance issues focus on a potential restructuring and consolidating of the US force presence in Korea and the possible movement of US forces from within the capital city of Seoul.<sup>10</sup>

Alliances are dynamic relationships. As the threat changes or is perceived to change, adjustments to an alliance are inevitable. This was also stressed at the SCM. “The Secretary and the Minister agreed on the importance of adapting the alliance to changes in the global security environment. Accordingly, they have established a Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative, in which the two countries will conduct policy-level discussions to develop options for modernizing and strengthening the alliance.”<sup>11</sup>

Whatever the future may hold of the ROK-US military alliance, it is a very important method of deterring North Korea today. During his February 2002 visit to the ROK, President George W. Bush re-emphasized the importance of the alliance.

The stability of this Peninsula is built on the great alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States. All of Asia, including North Korea, knows that America will stand firmly with our South Korean allies. We will sustain our obligations with honor. Our forces and our alliance are strong, and this strength is the foundation of peace on the peninsula.<sup>12</sup>

## **Military Power**

The aspect that makes this alliance so successful is the combined military force that both the Republic of Korea and the United States bring to the peninsula. This combined force was first started in October 1968 as a combined staff-planning group within the Eighth US Army.<sup>13</sup> It grew into a combined ROK-US Corps in 1971 and finally into the Combined Forces Command.

## **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 2000*, (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2000), 312.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 72.

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of National Defense, *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, (Seoul, ROK: Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 2002), 39.

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<sup>4</sup> Chae-Sung Chun, “Theoretical Approaches to Alliance: Implications on the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance”, *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol 7, Number 2, 2000, 73, on-line, Internet, available from <http://sias.snu.ac.kr/publication/d-jias/d-jias-db/d-jias-200002/d-jias-20000204.PDF>.

<sup>5</sup> Chun, 71.

<sup>6</sup> General Thomas Schwartz, “We Go Together”, in *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, 98.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Douglas J. Gillert, “US Forces in Korea Strengthens Alliance Hope,” *American Forces Press Service*, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/korea/usforces.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM Staff, “Asia-Pacific Region and the Global Campaign Against Terrorism”, *Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM*, Spring 2002, (Honolulu, Hi.: United States Pacific Command), 20.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense News Release, *Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué*, 5 Dec 2002, on-line, Internet, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02120904.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> President George W. Bush, statement at Dorasan Station, ROK, Feb 20, 2002. *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, 46.

<sup>13</sup> *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, 50.

## Chapter 5

### Combined Forces Command

*We operate in a combined command where two languages, two military structures and two cultures work side-by-side. Fundamentally, we train “joint and combined” every day. We strengthen the ROK-US alliance as we work and train together as one team.*

—General John H. Tilelli, Jr.  
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command, 1996-1999

### History

“Established on November 7, 1978, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) is the warfighting headquarters. Its role is to deter, or defeat if necessary, outside aggression against the ROK.”<sup>1</sup>

To accomplish that mission, the CFC has operational control over more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel of all services, of both countries. In wartime, augmentation could include some 3.5 million ROK reservists as well as additional US forces deployed from outside the ROK. If North Korea attacked, the CFC would provide a coordinated defense through its Air, Ground, Naval and Combined Marine Forces Component Commands and the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force. In-country and augmentation US forces would be provided to the CFC for employment by the respective combat component.<sup>2</sup>

The CFC is commanded by a US four-star general and has a ROK four-star general as a deputy commander. It is both a joint and combined command throughout all its

components. There are clear command relationships, with the Commander-in-Chief reporting to both the Republic of Korea and the United States command authorities.

Operational control (OPCON) of forces assigned for the defense of the ROK falls under CFC. “The CFC team shares the mutual responsibilities for planning, coordinating and executing our operational plans and exercises.”<sup>3</sup> Additionally, cooperation between the US and ROK extends to “combined defense planning, intelligence integration and sharing, a sophisticated logistical interface, educational exchanges and defense industry cooperation.”<sup>4</sup>

Although a slightly smaller fielded force than North Korea, the CFC can still pack a serious punch. “A snap shot of this power and might includes the ability to:

- Mobilize over 4.5 million troops
- Deploy over 250 combat ships and over four aircraft carrier battle groups
- Deploy over 1,000 helicopters
- Deploy over 1,500 strike aircraft
- Mobilize over 3,000 tanks
- Mobilize over 6,000 artillery pieces
- And mobilize over 5,000 other tracked vehicles.

Simply put: that’s power and might for any potential foe to reckon with.”<sup>5</sup>

## **Ground Forces**

The Ground Component Command (GCC) is comprised of both ROK and US forces. “The ROK Army makes up the core of their national defense and senior military leadership. Organized in the ROK Army Headquarters, three field army commands, the Aviation Operations Command, the Special Warfare Command, and units to support



these commands, the ROK Army consists of 11 corps (Capital Defense Command included), and 52 divisions and 20 brigades. Twelve of these divisions defend along the military demarcation line every day. Approximately 560,000 troops make up the army, and its core equipment includes some 2,250 tanks, 4,850 pieces of field artillery, and 2,300 armored vehicles. Additionally, there are 150 multiple rocket launchers, 30 missiles and 580 helicopters.”<sup>6</sup>

Two of the ROK field armies are defending south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The third field army is responsible for rear area security; the anti-infiltration mission; and the reception, staging, on-ward movement and integration of mobilized ROK forces and deployed US forces.

The ROK Aviation Operations Command “possesses various types of helicopters equipped with rockets, TOWs, Vulcan guns, and machine guns. The command provides maneuver forces with fire support, airlift and reconnaissance support, and if necessary, moves into the enemy’s rear area to conduct timely fire support and air strikes.”<sup>7</sup>

The US contribution to the GCC is anchored on the Eighth US Army and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division (2ID). The mission of the Eighth US Army is to conduct operations and support operations to sustain the Army forces assigned to the theater. The main combat element for US ground forces is the 2ID. The division has two maneuver brigades, with the third (or round out brigade) at Fort Lewis, Washington. 2ID has an attached aviation brigade and division artillery. “Major US ground weapons systems currently deployed in the ROK include M-1A1 Main Battle tanks, M2A2 and M-3A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, 155MM self-propelled howitzers, Multiple Rocket Launchers (MLRS), a PATRIOT battalion and a two-squadron AH-64 Brigade.”<sup>8</sup>

Additional US Army ground units would be committed to the Korean theater if hostilities commenced. This could include additional infantry, mechanized, armor, air defense, field artillery, aviation and support units as needed.

### **Naval Forces**

The naval force that is deployed in the AOR day-to-day is ROK only. “The ROK Navy Headquarters, Operations Command, Marine Corps Headquarters, and support units make up the ROK Navy. The ROK Navy has 67,000 troops including marines, and it operates approximately 200 vessels including submarines and 60 aircraft. Under the ROK Navy Operations Command, three fleets are based in the East Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Korea Strait, respectively. To guard its operational zone of responsibility, each fleet possesses combatants or combat vessels, e.g., destroyers, escorts, high-speed boats, etc. The Operational Command also has its own vessels and aircraft to conduct major naval component operations such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine operations, landing, salvage, and special operations.”<sup>9</sup>

The US Navy does not have a permanent presence in Korea with the exception of a forward headquarters element, US Naval Forces Korea. However, naval forces are not far away. The US 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet, home-based in Yokosuka, Japan, is the main unit of the Naval Component Command (NCC). The aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV63), the only forward deployed carrier of the US Navy, provides the foundation for a carrier battle group. Other potential ships would be the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) providing command and control, the USS Vincennes (CG49), USS Cowpens (CG63) and USS Chancellorsville (CG62) are Aegis guided missile cruisers. Also part of the carrier battle group would be guided missile destroyers, guided missile frigates, and support ships.

Embarked on the USS Kitty Hawk is a carrier air wing with fighter, fighter-bomber, patrol, airborne warning and control, anti-submarine warfare, and aviation support aircraft. The US Navy also brings the only tactical electronic countermeasures aircraft to the fight.

Additionally, the US Navy could assign other Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups to the AOR if needed.

### **Marine Forces**

The Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC) bring both ROK and US Marines to the fight. Similar to the naval structure, the ROK marines handle the armistice operations. While US Marines flow to theater during times of heightened readiness or conflict. “The [ROK] Marine Headquarters is organized into two divisions and one brigade. For amphibious landing operations, the marines possess a wide range of landing equipment, such as tanks and their own fire support.”<sup>10</sup>

The US portion of CMFC is the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, Japan. III MEF brings ground forces and aircraft that are capable of amphibious assaults, vertical envelopment, and special operations.

### **Air Forces**

The Air Component Command (ACC) provides the capability to gain and maintain air superiority over the Korean AOR. “The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, logistics Command, Training Command and two wings constitute the ROK Air Force. The two aforementioned wings are directly subordinate to the headquarters; the Anti-aircraft Artillery Command, Air Traffic Center, and nine tactical fighter wings

come under the Operations Command. Air Force personnel number 63,000 and the Air Force possess more than 780 aircraft including KF-16 fighters.”<sup>11</sup>

The US Air Force portion of ACC is the 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force. 7AF is located at Osan Air Base and includes the 51<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing and the 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing. “Squadrons within the 51<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing are equipped with 24 F-16C/D LANTIRN and 22 A-10s. Also stationed at Osan are U-2s from the 9<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Wing, Beale AFB, California. At Kunsan, the 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing is equipped with 42 F-16Cs.”<sup>12</sup>

Like both the US Army and US Navy, the US Air Force could flow additional fighter, bomber, recon, tanker and airlift assets to Korea. Upon arrival in the AOR, the 7AF would take operational control of these additional aircraft and integrate them into existing tasking orders.

## **Special Forces**

Rounding out the CFC forces is the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF). This combined Special Forces unit has both ROK and US forces. On the ROK side, “the Special Warfare Command consists of several brigades. Its main tasks include collecting intelligence, locating enemy targets and carrying out other designated tasks.”<sup>13</sup> The US side constitutes Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR). Army, Navy and Air Force Special Operations Command forces deploy to Korea in the event of hostilities. An example of an Air Force Special Ops mission would be to fly the AC-130 Spector Gunship and “provide close air support, air interdiction and armed reconnaissance for defending troops in the ROK.”<sup>14</sup>

Providing an adequate defense against infiltrating North Korean SOF forces has been a challenge for CFC forces. An innovative approach was developed as a concept in 1996

and put through several exercises starting in 1997. “The sea affords the North’s SOF their best avenue of approach. It is against this backdrop that CFC developed a concept and practiced a promising technique to counter the problem posed by North Korea’s maritime SOF. The CFC now cross attaches Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, from its Ground Component Command (GCC), to its Naval Component Command (NCC) on a temporary basis, depending on the situation, to attack enemy maritime-SOF assets before they reach ROK shores.”<sup>15</sup> “This unique joint and combined team is an example of the synergistic use of capabilities from more than one service and more than one nation to effectively attack and destroy an elusive enemy target.”<sup>16</sup>

## **Exercises**

“Thoroughly revamped in 1994, the CFC exercise program is the cornerstone for stability on the Korean Peninsula. Each exercise provides a visible, stable platform providing annual training in key Operations Plan (OPLAN) tasks or Joint Mission-Essential Tasks.”<sup>17</sup> Another important element of the exercise program is to train new personnel. Duty in the ROK for US personnel is still considered a one-year unaccompanied or two-year accompanied assignment. This quick rotation policy has personnel moving just when they are familiar with their mission in Korea. A comprehensive exercise program helps to hone those warfighting skills and increase unit readiness. “The basis of readiness is a combined and joint exercise program that includes events designed to train joint and combined commanders and staff on warfighting skills, exercise campaign plans, and practice various contingencies in case of renewed hostilities.”<sup>18</sup>

The CFC exercise program centers on three different exercises:

**Table 1. Annual CFC Exercise Table**

ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL)	Simulation-driven command post exercise (CPX) focused on key warfighting tasks, stresses the integration of the close, deep and rear battle.
FOAL EAGLE (FE)	An annual field training exercise focused on the rear battle, force-on-force, and amphibious operations, incorporates many of the previous TEAM SPIRIT training tasks.
RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSOI)	Simulation-driven command post exercise, focuses on the tasks of US reinforcement flow, rear area security, ROK reconstitution, operational logistics and sustainment.

**Source:** Department of Defense, *2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 12 Sept 2000, 3.

The exercise program provides other war fighting benefits than just readiness. For example, “UFL is an exercise that helps us remain strong and vigilant. It has the additional benefit of reminding the North and other potential adversaries of a firm allied resolve to protect freedom and stability on the peninsula and in the region. It strengthens the teamwork between the Republic of Korea and the United States. It is a forum for exchanging ideas on doctrine, organization and technology.”<sup>19</sup>

## **Modernization**

Another initiative to improve the war fighting capability of the CFC is through modernization of weapon systems. “The ROK defense improvement program was initiated in 1976 to modernize and improve the combat effectiveness of the ROK armed forces. Within the context of their defense strategy, ROK forces are undergoing modernization and improvements in many key areas through indigenous weapons

production, co-production, and procurement through Foreign Military Sale (FMS) and direct commercial channels.”<sup>20</sup>

The ROK Army has “co-production programs with the US [which] include the K-1 main battle tank, K-200 Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicle, K-55 self propelled 155mm howitzer, M-9 Armored Combat Earthmover and the UH-60P utility helicopter.”<sup>21</sup> They are also procuring the US-made Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the Army tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

The ROK Air Force inventory is mainly older model US aircraft. Namely, F-4s and F-5s. They have licensed production of the Korean version of the F-16, the KF-16. “Recent procurement initiatives include air-to-air refueling tankers, airborne C3I, and airborne early warning capability.”<sup>22</sup>

The ROK Navy is also improving its forces. “The ROK plans to initiate negotiations to procure three Aegis type destroyers. The ROK Navy also plans to procure eight additional P-3C anti-sub / anti-surface aircraft from the US and completely refurbish them.”<sup>23</sup>

The sale of US military hardware to the ROK is also very helpful when it comes to interoperability. As command, control, and communications systems become more complex, it is essential that all alliance systems be able to “talk” to each other. “This will ensure that military might can be brought to bear quickly and decisively as required. Not only will these systems improve today’s ROK-US combat power, they will also contribute to future regional security in Northeast Asia.”<sup>24</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Public Affairs Office, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, Eighth United States Army, "Mission of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command", *Backgrounder No. 2*, (Seoul, Korea: Yongsan Army Garrison, January 2000), 1, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/backgrounder/bg2.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> General Thomas A. Schwartz, "U.S. Forces, Korea and UN Command / ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command: Strength Through Friendship", in *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Summer 2001, 48.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 12 September 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Schwartz, Strength through Friendship, 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Schwartz, Strength through Friendship, 51.

<sup>15</sup> Public Affairs Office, United States Forces Korea, *Using Innovation and Synergy to Solve a Very Real and Substantial Threat*, (Seoul, Korea: Yongsan Army Garrison), 2, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/news/AntiSOF.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> General John H. Tilelli, Jr., "Ulchi-Focus Lens '97: Putting JV 2001 into Practice," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 1997-98, 76.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 77.

<sup>20</sup> *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 3.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Schwartz, Senate Armed Forces Committee statement, 17.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.



## Chapter 6

### United States Recent Policy

*Our partnership with the Republic of Korea goes far beyond our alliance relationship. We applaud South Korea's important contributions to stability and well-being all across the globe.*

— Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

The United States has taken an active role in Northeast Asia ever since the end of World War II. The relationship between the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was “forged in blood” during the Korean War. A 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States commits both nations to “deter armed attack” and “act to meet the common danger.”<sup>1</sup>

In a trip to South Korea in February 2002, President George W. Bush reaffirmed our commitment to Northeast Asia:

We hope for a day when the stability of the Korean Peninsula is built on peaceful reconciliation of North and South. Today, however, the stability of this Peninsula is built on the military might of our great alliance. In our dealings with North Korea, we've laid down a clear marker. We will stand by the people of South Korea. We will maintain our presence here. And as I told the Congress and the world in my State of the Union messages, we will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us or our friends or our allies with weapons of mass destruction.<sup>2</sup>

This commitment is the basis for stationing 37,000 US troops on the Korean Peninsula.

This size force is seen as a stabilizing factor within Northeast Asia, not just Korea.

The presence of US troops in the Republic of Korea is often debated. At the 34<sup>th</sup> ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting held December 5, 2002 in Washington DC, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Jun agreed “on the need to continue to maintain a US troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and concurred that the alliance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.”<sup>3</sup>

Whenever US troops are stationed outside the United States, many issues arise about host nation support. The Republic of Korea has been exceptional in providing for troop support. In 1999, the ROK paid 35% of costs associated with stationing US troops in Korea, a higher share than Germany paid in that year.<sup>4</sup> Another issue that comes up with stationing of troops outside the US is the Status of Forces (SOFA) agreement. SOFAs are “accords concluded between a host and sending nation to govern various issues arising from the presence of foreign troops.”<sup>5</sup> Specific features of a SOFA would cover criminal jurisdiction, return of land and military facilities not further needed, employment of Korean nationals within US bases, and even environmental provisions.<sup>6</sup> Recent demonstrations centered around a June 2002 accident where a US Army vehicle struck two South Korean children and killed them. Under the SOFA agreement, since the vehicle accident occurred during the performance of official military duties, the two Army soldiers involved in the accident were tried under an Army courts-martial and not under a Korean court. Several demonstrations occurred because the courts-martial panel acquitted the soldiers. However, because of situations like these, it is important to hold discussion between US and ROK officials to ensure both sides get fair treatment and it doesn’t impact the alliance.

Another pillar of US strategy is stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most recent version of *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* states the US will “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>7</sup> This policy is directed focused on countries like North Korea. Specifically, “in the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal.”<sup>8</sup> The Bush administration is keeping maximum pressure on North Korea to cease development of nuclear weapons. A recent White House press briefing continued to emphasize that “they need to dismantle their nuclear weapons program. This is a serious issue and we are continuing to work toward a peaceful resolution with our friends and allies in the region.”<sup>9</sup>

The United States continues to engage North Korea diplomatically. While there is great concern for North Korea not living up to its agreements, especially the 1994 Agreed Framework, the current approach to deal with this is through discussions. These discussions are not only bilateral with North Korea, but also enlist the aid of other nations in the region. This includes consulting “with Russia, with China, with South Korea and with Japan”<sup>10</sup> as a multi-lateral solution is sought. The desired end result is that North Korea abides by its international agreements and halts its violations of the Agreed Framework, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Agency Safeguards Agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.<sup>11</sup>

The United States was prepared to enter into a comprehensive dialogue with the DPRK on a number of security issues. These included “improved implementation of the

Agreed Framework, reduction of the North Korean Missile threat, movement on military confidence building measures and humanitarian concerns.”<sup>12</sup> However, this approach has been taken off the table until the nuclear weapons issue is resolved. The Bush administration has made it very clear that North Korea must stop developing nuclear weapons before the US can have future meaningful discussions. In a recent statement, President Bush said, “We are united in our desire for a peaceful resolution of this situation. We are also united in our resolve that the only option for addressing this situation is for North Korea to completely and visibly eliminate its nuclear weapons program.”<sup>13</sup>

The Bush administration still sees that a multilateral approach to dealing with North Korea is the best approach. Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “He believes a multilateral setting is still ‘the best way to approach this problem’”<sup>14</sup> Secretary of State Powell presented this approach to newly inaugurated South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun. During initial discussions between President Roh and Powell there was agreement on the multilateral approach to dealing with North Korea. Powell states, “After I had discussed the multilateral approach with president Roh...it was a pretty straight acceptance of what I said, a multilateral approach, we agreed.”<sup>15</sup> Several other countries are supporting the multilateral approach. One of the first advocates was Australia, then Japan and South Korea, while China “listened carefully.”<sup>16</sup>

While the recent focus on North Korea has been on their nuclear weapons program, there is still another problem that they are facing – chronic food shortages. This has been an issue since massive floods wiped out the 1995-rice crop. The United States has been a major donor of food to North Korea. Since 1995, the US has donated “nearly 2 million

metric tons of food, valued at approximately \$650 million.”<sup>17</sup> “In 2002, our total contribution of 157,000 metric tons made us the World Food Program’s largest donor to North Korea.”<sup>18</sup> This year the US is prepared to continue food donations. The Bush administration policy is focused on helping the people of North Korea “without regard to US concerns about North Korea’s policies. However, closer monitoring of food distribution is called for.”<sup>19</sup>

The biggest concern for food donations is that the North Korean government will divert the food to the KPA for military use and not to the general population that it is intended. Distribution of the food is usually with a non-governmental organization like the World Food Program so a third party can be a neutral observer.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 2000*, (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2000), 312.

<sup>2</sup> President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Troops,” Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, February 21, 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020221-6.html>.

<sup>3</sup> US Department of Defense News Release, Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué, December 5, 2002, available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/www43eb.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of National Defense, *ROK-US Alliance and USFK*, (Seoul, ROK: Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 2002), 71.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 66-68.

<sup>7</sup> The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 13.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>9</sup> Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan, “White House Report, November 14, 2002,” n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/whonnk.htm>.

## Notes

<sup>10</sup> Ari Fleischer, “White House Press Briefing, December 13, 2002,” n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021213-6.html#5>.

<sup>11</sup> Department of Defense News Release, “Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué,” December 5, 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwwh43eb.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Department of State, “Joint Press Availability by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Seung-Soo,” Seoul, Korea, July 27, 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://usemabssy.state.gov/toyko/wwwwhse0257.html>.

<sup>13</sup> Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 15, 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021115-8.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Department of State, “Transcript: Powell Cites Asian Support for U.S. Proposal on N. Korea,” in *Washington File*, (Seoul, ROK: United States Embassy), 26 Feb 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwwh43gc.html>.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Department of State, “Text: State Department Says U.S. to Donate More Food to North Korea,” in *Washington File*, (Seoul, ROK: United States Embassy), 25 Feb 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwwh43gb.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 7

### Japan

*I intend for Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea and other nations concerned to maintain close contact and relieve tensions on the Korean Peninsula with a view to creating peace throughout this region.*

— Junichiro Koizumi  
Prime Minister of Japan

One of our most important allies in Northeast Asia is Japan. Since the end of the Second World War the United States has been providing for the defense of this island nation. Over that timeframe, the relationship between these two nations has been very strong. The Japan-US security relationship is based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America. This treaty allows for a response should an armed attack occur on either nation within the Japanese archipelago. At a recent meeting between the US Secretary of State, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of State for Defense, they “reaffirmed the important role of their bilateral security arrangements as the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and reaffirmed their commitment to those arrangements. The Ministers confirmed that the US military presence in the region is essential for regional stability.”<sup>1</sup>

Japan is limited in having a standing military force, but they are allowed to maintain a Self Defense Force (SDF). “Japan remains constitutionally (not to mention politically and psychologically) prohibited from developing an offensive or power projection military capability or from participating in potentially-threatening alliances of collective security arrangements or schemes.”<sup>2</sup> The SDF is organized into Ground, Maritime and Air SDFs. Although the Japanese SDF is restricted in conducting offensive military operations, they have conducted support-type missions. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has re-supplied the US Navy and the Air Self Defense Force has provided airlift.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty also allows for the stationing of US forces in Japan. Currently, III Marine Expeditionary Force, the Fifth Air Force, and Seventh Fleet are stationed in Japan. These forces not only provide for the defense of Japan, but are a key US deterrent throughout Northeast Asia.

During contingencies, like war on the Korean peninsula, Japan would provide rear area support for US forces. Defined in September 1997, The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation establishes several support functions.

For instance, the revised Guidelines outline Japanese rear area support to US forces responding to a regional contingency. This support may include providing access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with US forces to conduct such missions and functions as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce UN sanctions. By enhancing the alliance’s capability to respond to crises, the revised Guidelines are an excellent example of preventive diplomacy: they contribute to shaping the security environment by improving deterrence and stability in the region.<sup>4</sup>

Japan has been very active in the diplomatic front on the Korean peninsula. They have been trying to improve relations with both North and South Korea. This effort has



focused largely on building trust between the governments. Japan is trying to overcome a hurdle that dates back to 1910 when Japan formally annexed the Korean peninsula and occupied that country until the end of World War II. There is still lingering animosity in Korea from the Japanese occupation.<sup>5</sup>

The Japanese Prime Minister met with the President of the Republic of Korea in July 2002 and “both expressed their determination to develop the Japan-ROK cooperative relationship to even a higher dimension on the basis of bilateral trust and respect.”<sup>6</sup> They also agreed to history and cultural exchanges, cooperative efforts on the economy and trade and in the international arena on counter-terrorism.

There are still some major stumbling blocks between Japan and the ROK. There are ongoing disputes over territorial rights over Takeshima (Tok-do) Island, fishing rights in the northern islands and how Japan is portraying itself in history textbooks.<sup>7</sup>

Japan has had official talks with North Korea beginning in 1990. Several times in the 1990s these talks have been suspended based on North Korean actions. For example, Japan suspended talks after the Taepodong missile launch in 1998 and when a North Korean spy ship was off Japan’s coast in 1999. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Kim Jong-il on September 17, 2002. Progress was made toward normalization of relations between the two countries and Kim acknowledged the abduction of Japanese nationals.<sup>8</sup> It is seen by many that Japan wants to take a stronger role in dealing with Northeast Asia issues and these discussions with North Korea are specific indications.

In dealing with North Korea, Japan has also been contributing food aid to help with ongoing shortages. On March 2000, “Japan decided to provide 100,000 tons of food aid to North Korea through the World Food Program.”<sup>9</sup> It is Japan’s intent that “in addition

to humanitarian considerations, the assistance was extended from the broader perspective of peace and stability for the region.”<sup>10</sup>

As part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a Korean Peninsula Energy Development organization (KEDO) was established. Its main function was to provide light-water reactors (LWRs) and heating oil in exchange for North Korea shutting down its graphite-type nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Japan, the United States and South Korea, were financing this effort; developing the LWRs; and providing alternative energy to North Korea until the reactors were finished. Japan has contributed close to \$300 million to this project.<sup>11</sup> The government of Japan is very concerned about nuclear developments within North Korea and is working with the international community to ensure they dismantle their nuclear weapons program.

Over the last decade, Japan has become a major influence on affairs in Northeast Asia. They are taking a greater leadership role and have become active participants with the United States and the Republic of Korea on peninsula issues.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington D.C., December 16, 2002, available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Dujarric, *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*, (Indianapolis, Ind: Hudson Institute, 1998), 27.

<sup>3</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2002*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002), 54, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-e.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington D.C.: Office of International Security Affairs, November 1998), n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/#section2>.

<sup>5</sup> Dujarric, 27.

<sup>6</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting,” July 1, 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/pv0206/summit.html>.

## Notes

<sup>7</sup> Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2002, 61-63.

<sup>8</sup> Victor Cha, “Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang”, *Comparative Connections*, ed. Brad Glosserman and Vivian Brailey Fritschi, (Honolulu, Hi.: Pacific Forum CSIS, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2002), on-line, Internet, available from [http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qjapan\\_skorea.html](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qjapan_skorea.html).

<sup>9</sup> Ming Liu, “The American, South Korean and Japanese North Korea Policy and the DPRK’s Response” in *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, vol. 10, no 2, ed. Kim, Kyu-Ryoon (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Korean Institute for National Unification, 2001), 124.

<sup>10</sup> Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2002, 35.

<sup>11</sup> Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2002, 38.

## Chapter 8

### China

*China is fully committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.*

— President Jiang Zemin  
People's Republic of China

The Peoples Republic of China has been a long time ally of North Korea. Sharing a common boarder of over 1,400 kilometers, China assisted the DPRK during and after the Korean War and contributed heavily to its postwar reconstruction. In 1961, they signed The Agreement on Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the DPRK. For over forty years, China was one of North Korea's primary partners providing military equipment, trade and economic assistance. However, since the mid-1990s, this relationship has changed. China established diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992, significantly changing the relationship with North Korea.

China still maintains the bilateral security treaty with North Korea, "although the Chinese have made it clear that the agreement is defensive in nature and would not necessarily apply in situations where Pyongyang was the aggressor."<sup>1</sup> A war on the Korean peninsula would not be in China's best interests. With a heavy concentration of

Chinese-Koreans living in the area next to North Korea, “massive numbers of refugees streaming across the border into its territory would be a grave concern and threat.”<sup>2</sup> China has developed its northeast region with heavy industry and would not want to disrupt that production.<sup>3</sup> China still looks at North Korea as a buffer zone, and would prefer to maintain the status quo. The impact to China’s economic development, especially with the ROK, would also be affected.

Trade is an important factor in China’s Northeast Asia policy. As North Korea’s economy worsened during the 1990s, China turned to Seoul to strengthen its economic development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China presented this view:

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Governments of the two countries have successively signed a series of agreements including the agreement on trade cooperation, the agreements on investment protection, on the establishment of a joint committee on economic, trade and technological cooperation, on marine transportation, on avoiding double-taxation and preventing tax-evasion and on the peaceful use of nuclear powers. The bilateral economic and trade cooperation has achieved a steady, healthy and rapid development.<sup>4</sup>

Trade between China and South Korea has increased steadily in the mid-to-late 1990s. Although hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1998, the rate rose again in 1999. “Sino-ROK trade volume in 2000 was 34.5 billion US dollars, an increase of 38% over the previous year.”<sup>5</sup> These numbers reflect that trade is important to both China and the ROK. This extends into the investment arena also. China has become South Korea’s largest destination for foreign investment surpassing the United States.<sup>6</sup>

China continues to support North Korea economically and is its major trading partner. They have “consistently provided the DPRK with food, coke, crude oil, chemical fertilizer etc. free of charge. In 2000, bilateral trade rose to 488 million US dollars, an

increase of 31.8% over the previous year, out of which China's export to the DPRK was 451 million US dollars and import from the DPRK was 37 million US dollars. China's export commodities mainly consist of crude oil, machinery and electrical products and daily necessities and import mainly include steel and iron, timber, mineral products and aquatic products.”<sup>7</sup> From a regional perspective, the economic assistance China provides North Korea could have a longer-term impact. “One negative impact of China’s assistance is the diminishing need for North Korea to negotiate seriously with South Korea and consequently Chinese aid contributes to the continuation of the North-South confrontation in Korea.”<sup>8</sup>

One area for concern throughout Northeast Asia is the continuing build-up of Chinese military capability. “Since the end of the Cold War, China has been viewed as the main source of threats and arms buildups in East Asia. It has increased its defense spending by over ten percent per annum and continued to modernize its armed forces.”<sup>9</sup> With nearly 3 million people under arms, China possesses the world’s largest army. They are continuing to increase their capabilities. “China is investing heavily to modernize the military, expecting to further raise its status as a global superpower.”<sup>10</sup> Their modernization efforts have included updating aircraft, naval vessels, submarines and ballistic missiles. Official Chinese defense policy states, “China firmly pursues a defensive national defense policy and is determined to safeguard its state sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and security.”<sup>11</sup> Although there is common agreement that China would defend its sovereignty if threatened from Korea, their near-term focus is on internal issues. Specifically, “settlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the

complete re-unification of China embodies the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.”<sup>12</sup>

China is very interested in maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula. It has “pursued a diplomatic policy designed to balance its aim at maintaining good relations with the North and South against its strategy of strengthening its influence on the two Koreas.”<sup>13</sup> This middle ground has served China well over the last decade. It would seem that developing close ties to both North and South adds more than just economic benefits. If re-unification of the two Koreas is possible in the future, than China may also gain increased clout with Korea. “Beijing is carefully enhancing its ties with both Seoul and Pyongyang while positioning itself as a potential replacement to the United States as security guarantor for a united Korea.”<sup>14</sup>

While China is currently focused on developing its economy and resolving internal issues like Taiwan, maintaining the existing armistice agreement on the Korean peninsula is important. At a November 4, 2002 Trilateral Meeting of the leaders of Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, China stated:

We support the Joint South-North Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Implementation of the Agreed Framework is important. We support the peaceful reunification of the ROK and North Korea. We had not been informed anything about the North Korea's nuclear program. We hope that this problem would be resolved through peaceful consultations.<sup>15</sup>

When it comes to nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, China has been very supportive of eliminating their spread. At the summit between President George W. Bush and PRC President Jiang Zemin, “Jiang reiterated China's commitment to helping keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.”<sup>16</sup> China also joined with Russia on condemning North Korean nuclear aspirations. A Joint Sino-Russian Statement issued on

December 2, 2002 stated, “The sides consider it important for the destiny of the world and security in Northeast Asia to preserve the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula and the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>17</sup> Clearly, a stable peninsula, free of nuclear weapons would be in all the parties’ best interest.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ralph A. Cossa, *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security*, McNair paper no 51, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 39.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Dujarric, *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*, (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Hudson Institute, 1998), 25.

<sup>3</sup> Kang Choi and Taeho Kim, “China-ROK Relations and the Future of Asian Security” in *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2000), 221.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *China and Republic of Korea*, 2000, available from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4416.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Scott Snyder, “Happy Tenth for PRC-ROK Relations! Celebrate While You Can, Because Tough Times are Ahead” in *Comparative Connections* ed. Brad Glosserman and Vivian Brailey Fritschi, (Honolulu, Hi.: Pacific Forum CSIS, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2002), on-line, Internet, available from [http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qchina\\_skorea.html](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qchina_skorea.html).

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, 2000, available from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4445.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Dujarric, 24.

<sup>9</sup> Dujarric, 23.

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 2000*, (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2000), 30.

<sup>11</sup> Information Office of the State Council, *China's National Defense in 2000*, (Beijing, People's Republic of China, October 2000), n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/20-3.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2001*, (Tokyo, Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2001), 182.

<sup>14</sup> Cossa, 39.

<sup>15</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trilateral Meeting of the leaders of Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea Summary”, 4 November 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/trilateral.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Bush deems China 'an ally'”, *Cable News Network*, 26 October 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/26/china.texas/index.html>.



## Notes

<sup>17</sup> Cable News Network Asia, "Joint Sino-Russian Statement," *Cable News Network* 2 December 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from <http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/02/china.putin/index.html>.

## Chapter 9

### United States Policy and Strategy Implications

*The stability of this Peninsula is built on the military might of our great alliance. In our dealings with North Korea, we've laid down a clear marker. We will stand by the people of South Korea. We will maintain our presence here...we will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us or our friends or our allies with weapons of mass destruction.*

—President George W. Bush

The Asia-Pacific region is vital to the security of the United States, therefore, our policy for situations on the Korean Peninsula must show our resolve and willingness to accomplish our national security objectives. These policies should show that the United States will stay engaged on the issue, show a commitment to a continued US presence in South Korea, be conducted together with our ROK and other regional allies, and be sustained over the long haul.

### Engagement

Any US policy needs to bring all aspects of national power to bear: economic, diplomatic, informational and military. “The Asia-Pacific region encompasses dozens of extremely diverse countries, all in different stages of political, economic, and social development. A ‘one size fits all’ approach is ill-advised.”<sup>1</sup> Any response must

maximize US opportunities to stay engaged with these nations through economic forums, military exchanges, combined exercises and diplomatic settings. In one word this means being engaged in the region.

Although diplomatic engagement is a mission of the State Department, the United States Pacific Command plays a very important role also. The Commander, US Pacific Command travels to many, if not all, of the 43 countries under his area of responsibility. Building upon the cooperation at the military level reaches into many areas of the countries within the Asia-Pacific region. This level of engagement needs to be continued.

Additionally, major military exercises build trust, cooperation and understanding on both sides. In addition to the three exercises run each year within the ROK, US Pacific Command hosts exercises with most of our friends and allies in the region. Besides the military benefit that these nations get from combined exercises, the intangible benefits of understanding US security aims of preserving the peace in the region is vital.

## **Alliances**

The key to our commitment to this region is thorough our alliances. They have become the foundation on which close relationships have been forged with several nations in the region. The United States needs to continue and build upon the “bilateral defense-related ties with the five American alliances in the region – South Korea, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines – as well as with numerous friends such as Singapore and Taiwan.”<sup>2</sup> The ability to resolve disputes or avoid them all together is enhanced when multiple countries are working together to solve common problems. A policy that is more inclusive of other countries would be well served.

Specifically, the ROK – US alliance has been hailed as one of the best alliances ever. While “forged in blood” on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK has been a very supporting ally off the peninsula. To ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, this alliance is absolutely vital. While negotiations about troop locations, SOFA status, and host nation support capture headlines, the fundamentals of deterring aggression and defeating it, if necessary, still plays as soundly today as it did in 1953. Until the DMZ expands 40 kilometers from the MDL (military demarcation line) and not just spans it by 4 kilometers, strong defense alliances will be needed.

If North Korea continues to expand the range of its weapons inventory with long-range ballistic missiles, then the threat ring expands also. Most noticeably are the implications for Japan. If the ROK is a pillar of our Northeast Asia strategy, than our alliance with Japan must be the bedrock. Any increased threat to Japan would be very destabilizing to the region.

### **Multilateral negotiations**

While at times bi-lateral negotiations may be a more straightforward way to deal with crises on the Korean Peninsula, there are many players that have a vested interest in the outcomes there. As a minimum, a multilateral approach that includes South Korea, Japan and China will yield a more integrated security solution; one that would hold up better over time. The downfall of a multilateral approach would be that North Korea could feel very threatened and therefore entrench its negotiating style rather than be persuaded to deal in good faith.

The role of both China and Japan needs to be highlighted. They are critical to a lasting peace on the peninsula. With China being the dominant power on the Asian

mainland, and a historical ally of North Korea, they have a major role to play. It certainly is not in China's best interest to see a crisis in North Korea get out of hand. China could be a key player in getting North Korea to listen to reason and act as a negotiator on the North's behalf.

The role for Japan is somewhat different. With the world's third largest economy, Japan's strength is the ability to bring economic help to North Korea. The Kim Jong-il - Prime Minister Koizumi meeting in 2002 was beginning to set the stage for future discussions. Japan was also an important member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and willing to finance the lightwater reactors being built in North Korea. Economic opportunities and possible financing of ventures in North Korea should be an invaluable part of the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan seems very willing to play a part.

To get all these parties to come together and discuss peaceful solutions has been a very difficult process. Two possible multilateral options come to mind: extend the four-party forum or create a new Peninsula Security Forum. The end goal between the two techniques are the same: to engage in discussions to promote a lasting peace on the peninsula, to quell the military threat both sides perceive, to put in place a verification system that will ensure compliance to agreements, and to ensure the territorial integrity of both North and South Korea. By extending the four-party talks between US, ROK, DPRK, and China; one could spring board off an existing platform to get all sides into discussions. Sometimes, existing frameworks carry too much past baggage with them. Therefore, a new Peninsula Security Forum could be an option. In this forum Japan and or Russia should be added to the four-party members. It would also be wise to elect a

neutral nation to be the moderator, one that is sufficiently removed from the situation. Although, Switzerland and Sweden come to mind, they are both members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee (NNSC) and have current camps within the DMZ.

Regardless of the forum for negotiations, an underlying factor in the conduct of negotiations with North Korea must be addressed. The United States can not reward bad behavior. The US must not allow North Korea to use its time-honored technique of creating a crisis only to extract demands to settle that exact crisis. Negotiating with North Korea takes clearly stated goals, strong determination and willingness to stay the course when obstacles are placed at every turn of events. Concessions that are made must be commensurate with the final objectives, otherwise North Korea will perceive this as a sign of weakness.

### **Military Presence**

The willingness for the US to use military force if other instruments fail is an important part of US national security policy. While diplomatic negotiations to end a crisis are always preferred, diplomacy needs to be backed-up with military power. Because the distances in the Asia-Pacific region are so vast, a continued forward deployment of military forces is necessary. A continued presence also shows a commitment on the part of the United States to this region.

A strong military option is very useful when negotiating with the North Koreans. A regime that relies heavily on its own military might could only be expected to conduct real negotiations with an equal. Therefore, having military equality to a slight edge could also be very useful at the negotiating table.

The force structure that the US has committed to the ROK has a good balance. The permanent ground forces bring a great deal of mobility and firepower to the situation. The only possible addition would be more resources for the counter-artillery mission. With North Korea having an enormous advantage in artillery that is located close to the DMZ, counter-artillery would be a very important deterrent. Although there are not many US airframes on the peninsula, a great attribute of airpower is its ability to respond quickly to a crisis. This would be the case for Korea. Aircraft from all over the Pacific area could respond very quickly, and fly combat mission over North Korea as needed. The same is true with the US Navy. Although steaming time is still measured in days, with the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet coming from Japan, naval action would be well in hand.

The US military presence on the Korean Peninsula may only be the tip of the spear, but it brings a tremendous capability combined with an ever-modernizing ROK armed force.

### **Sustained Operations**

Technically, a state of war still exists on the Korean Peninsula. The armistice of 1953 has put a halt to major combat operations, but has never decided the final outcome. The two Koreas still remain divided. Little progress has been made in the last 50 years in resolving fundamental differences between these two countries. Therefore, any long-term response to the situation on the Korean Peninsula must be prepared to deal in terms of years or decades. As the US has demonstrated, its long-term resolve is firm toward South Korea and must remain so.

## **Humanitarian**

The final area of discussion has to deal with humanitarian aid to North Korea. As is the present case, the issuing of food and medical assistance should not be used as a bargaining chip. Even though the policies of North Korea are detrimental to its own people, many nations of the world can pitch in to assist in feeding the hungry. There should be some concern that this food assistance would be diverted to the North Korean military. Therefore, private non-governmental organizations that have worked these problems on an international scale should be monitoring the food distribution areas throughout North Korea. As long as North Korea can guarantee their safety, humanitarian assistance should be an easily worked program.

## **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, *The Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National Security Calculus for a New Millennium*, (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 23.

<sup>2</sup> Catharin Dalpino and Bates Gill, ed., *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2001-02*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, 2002), 52.



## Chapter 10

### Conclusion

*We have proven that when the soldiers of the Republic of Korea and the US stand together they can accomplish anything!*

—General Thomas A. Schwartz  
CINCCFC, 1999-2002

The Korean peninsula is the fulcrum for the entire Northeast Asia region. When the geopolitical and strategic interests of so many countries converge on a single location, the stakes will be high. However, while exploring the security environment, and the policies of the major players in the region, it is clear that stability can be brought to this region. The United States, Japan, and China all have vested interests and their cooperation and joint efforts can be successful.

Although North Korea is raising the international stakes with their pursuit of developing nuclear weapons, this issue can be a rallying point for all the major powers in the region to unite. The common interest of stopping nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism and avoiding a military conflict could provide the foundation to achieving regional security in Northeast Asia.

The combination of a strong ROK - US military alliance; an effective combined warfighting command, Combined Forces Command; and the multilateral involvement of China and Japan would be a powerful deterrent to North Korea. Only by bringing

together the diplomatic, economic and military aspects of these countries can the hope for a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula be achieved.


This idea of working together toward the common goal has been engrained within the combined military forces of both the United States and the Republic of Korea. During the Korean War, a well-known ROK Division Commander General Paik, Sun-yup used the phrase “Katchi Kapshida” meaning “we go together” when leading a counterattack. This phrase has become a motto at the ROK/US Combined Forces Command focuses the path on which all parties must take to achieve peace and stability in Korea – we must go together.

## **Appendix A**

### **North Korean Theater Ballistic Missiles**

The following two graphics show the threat ranges of North Korean Theater Ballistic Missiles. The first one depicts short and medium-range missiles of the SCUD and Nodong class. The second chart focuses on the longer range Taep'o-dong missiles.


North Korean Short and Medium Range Missile Capabilities  
(Launched from areas near the demilitarized zone)



Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division  
October 1999

**Figure 3 Short and Medium Range Missiles**

### Potential North Korean Long-Range Missile Capabilities



Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division  
October 1999

**Figure 4 Long Range Missiles**

## Appendix B

### Recent North Korean Actions

The following table summarizes actions taken by North Korea during the recent crisis (October 2002 to March 2003).

**Table 2. North Korean Actions**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Incident</b>
March 3, 2003	US officials say four armed North Korean fighter jets intercepted a US reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan on Sunday morning, Korean time, and one used its radar in a manner that indicated it might attack. After 20 minutes the fighters depart.
Feb. 27	US officials confirm Yongbyon reactor is operating.
Feb. 24	North Korea launches an anti-ship missile into the sea off its east coast on the eve of the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.
Feb. 6	North Korea says it is restarting a reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.
Jan. 10	North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Dec. 27, 2002	North Korea expels U.N. nuclear weapons inspectors.
Dec. 21	North Korea begins removing monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities.
Dec. 12	North Korea announces plans to reactivate its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that were frozen under the 1994 deal with the United States.
Dec. 10	A freighter, carrying Scud missiles from North Korea, is intercepted in the Arabian Sea on its way to Yemen.
Nov. 11	The United States and its allies halt oil shipments to North Korea promised under the 1994 agreement.

Oct. 16	US officials disclose the existence of a North Korea nuclear weapons program, having learned of it 12 days earlier.
Oct. 4	North Korean officials disclose to a visiting US delegation that the country has a covert nuclear weapons program in violation of a 1994 agreement to halt nuclear weapons development.

**Source:** “A Look at Recent Actions by North Korea”, *Associated Press*, March 3, 2003, on-line, Internet, available from [http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=516&u=/ap/north\\_korea\\_glance&printer=1](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=516&u=/ap/north_korea_glance&printer=1).

## *Glossary*

ACC	Air Component Command
AOR	Area Of Responsibility
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
AU	Air University
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMFC	Combined Marine Forces Command
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSIS	Center of Strategic and International Studies
CUWTF	Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force
CW	Chemical Warfare
DOD	Department of Defense
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FE	Foal Eagle
GCC	Ground Component Command
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KPA	Korean People's Army
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
MRL	Multiple Rocket Launcher
MRLS	Multiple Rocket Launch System
NCC	Naval Component Command
nK	North Korea
NKAF	North Korean Air Force
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
NPT	Nonproliferation Treaty



OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
RSOI	Reception, Staging, On-ward movement and Integration
SAM	Surface-to-air Missile
SOCKOR	Special Operations Command - Korea
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TBM	Theater Ballistic Missile
TOW	Tube-launch, Optically guided, Wire controlled
UFL	Ulchi Focus Lens
UNC	United Nations Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USFK	United States Forces Korea
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPK	Worker's Party of Korea

**Combined Command.** Refers to a military organization that contains forces from two or more different countries. The Combined Forces Command is a combined command with forces from the Republic of Korea and the United States.

**East Sea.** Korean designation for the body of water to the east of the Korean peninsula. Usually referred to as the Sea of Japan.

**Joint Command.** Refers to a military organization that contains elements of two or more components. The United States Forces Korea is a joint command and contains Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Forces components.

**West Sea.** Korean designation for the body of water to the west of the Korean peninsula. Usually referred to as the Yellow Sea.

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